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ABSTRACT  
A two-sided market involves two different user groups 
whose interactions are enabled over a platform that provides a 
distinct set of values to either side. In such market systems, one 
side’s participation depends on the value created by presence 
of the other side over the platform. Two-sided market platforms 
must acquire enough users on both sides in appropriate 
proportions to generate value to either side of the user market. 
In this paper, we present a simplified, generic mathematical 
model for two-sided markets with an intervening platform that 
enables interaction between the two different sets of users with 
distinct value propositions. The proposed model captures both 
the same side as well as cross-side effects (i.e., network 
externalities) and can capture any behavioral asymmetry 
between the different sides of the two-sided market system. The 
cross-side effects are captured using the notion of affinity 
curves while same side effects are captured using four rate 
parameters. We demonstrate the methodology on canonical 
affinity curves and comment on the attainment of stability at the 
equilibrium points of two-sided market systems. Subsequently a 
stochastic choice-based model of consumers and developers is 
described to simulate a two-sided market from grounds-up and 
the observed affinity curves are documented. Finally we discuss 
how the two-sided market model links with and impacts the 
engineering characteristics of the platform.  
 
Keywords: two-sided markets, affinity curves, critical mass, equilibrium, 
stability conditions, choice model, open platforms. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A two-sided market involves two different user groups 
whose interactions are usually enabled over an open platform 
[2]. The two sides of the market represent the two primary sets 
of economic agents while the platform acts as an enabler or 
catalyst for bringing together the two distinct set of economic 
agents. In such markets, both categories of economic agents 
have to be present on the platform in right proportions to create 
enough value to both sides and thereby accelerate and/or 
sustain the platform. Hence, in such market systems, one side’s 
participation depends on the value created by presence of the 
other side over the platform. This is termed as the cross-side 
network effect or network externalities. 
For example, video game platforms like Sony PlayStation 
need to attract users and game developers. Users prefer 
platforms with many games, while developers prefer platforms 
with many users. The users get attracted to the video game 
platform when there is a large number and variety of games 
available on the platform.  
Developers of such two-sided market platforms must 
acquire enough number of users on both sides in appropriate 
proportion to generate value to either side of the user market 
and thereby provide the foundation for sustained future growth. 
In other words, developers must attain and overcome the 
critical mass on either side of the market for sustainable future 
growth. This is a difficult market coordination problem and is 
often described as the chicken-and-egg problem in the literature 
[6]. This aspect is central to any model that aims to simulate 
two-sided market systems. Most two-sided markets tend to die 
early (i.e., infant mortality) because they cannot bring the 
minimum viable number of members on both sides in 
appropriate proportion for subsequent self-sustenance and 
growth [6, 7, 9].  
Much of the prior work on two-sided markets have 
employed game theory, primarily by economists but a growing 
body of work instead studies competition in such markets as a 
random process with an embedded diffusion process modeling 
technology adoption processes [3, 5, 10] with emphasis almost 
entirely on the pricing structure of two sided markets under 
steady state. There are relatively few references [1, 7, 9] that 
have looked at modeling two-sided markets during the 
initiation phase that involves transient effects. This can be 
achieved by modeling the system as a time evolving dynamical 
system [12, 13, 14].  
While the market dynamics does not directly concern 
engineering designers, understanding platform users’ needs and 
use behavior is fundamental for the definition of requirements 
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and product strategy. These aspects have already been amply 
highlighted in product development literature [2, 7], but in the 
case of open platforms, they assume specific connotations. 
First, the presence of network externalities has a strong 
influence on the adoption rate of a platform [2, 7], thus altering 
the traditional project financing and production forecasts. 
Secondly, as different sides of the platform have different 
needs, the definition of requirements should consider both sides 
at the same time as interactions between the two sides. This 
new set of requirements make two-sided markets unique and 
determine the success and failure of the associated platform [6]. 
Furthermore, the definition of the initial offerings over the 
platform is expected to be decisive in determining the critical 
mass [6, 7]. Finally, the designers of the platform do not have 
complete control over the platform design space and the 
platform evolution, as they are partially determined by external 
developers. It is therefore of vital importance to anticipate 
potential future needs, as the ability to meet them can be 
constrained by initial design decisions. This aspect is even 
more critical for open platforms with an expected long life-
cycle.  
In this paper, we present a simplified, generic 
mathematical model for two-sided markets with an intervening 
platform that enables interaction between the two different sets 
of users with distinct value propositions. One set is interested in 
using the platform, while the other provides the means for the 
usage; and the relationship between the two sides is mediated 
by the exchange over the enabling platform. The proposed 
model captures both the same side as well as cross-side effects 
(i.e., network externalities) and can capture any behavioral 
asymmetry between the different sides of the two-sided market 
system. The cross-side effects are captured using the notion of 
affinity curves while same side effects are captured using four 
rate parameters. This dynamic model is used to find the 
equilibrium points of the overall market system under 
consideration and investigate the stability of such equilibrium 
points [1, 13, 14]. We derive the stability conditions for the 
system equilibrium points and show that they can be defined in 
terms of the rate parameters only and are not directly dependent 
on the class of affinity curves chosen.  
A simple choice model is employed to model the behavior 
of users and derive two families of canonical affinity curves. 
We apply the methodology to canonical affinity curves. 
We also comment about the attainment of stable equilibrium for 
the two-sided market systems with these affinity curves.  
Finally, a general perspective on integrative open platform 
design, linking the two-sided market model to engineering 
decisions/artifacts is presented. 
 
 
2. MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE TWO-SIDED 
MARKET 
Having described an outline of the mathematical model of 
the two-sided market system, let us get into the details of the 
model.  
In a two-sided market, there are two primary modes that 
lead to evolution of the market size on either side of the market: 
(1) the same-side or direct network effect, and (2) the cross-side 
network effect or network externalities.  
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Figure 1: Representation of the two-sided market with consumers on one side 
and product or modules on the other. The Providers are the developers of the 
products that are exchanged over the platform. 
 
The same-side effects include factors that originate from 
the side the participant is in. For example, in Figure 1 above, 
the same-side effects on the consumer side will not depend 
explicitly on the characteristics of the product side. Such effects 
will include quality of the device or services, recurring costs of 
the products, unmet requirements, economic variables, etc.   
The cross-side effect is key to the growth and sustainability 
of two-sided markets and is the focus of this paper. This 
network externality effect acts as a “catalyst” that facilitates the 
interaction between the economic agents on two sides of the 
“curtain” (see Figure 1). The purely cross-side effects are 
captured by the affinity curves. They indicate the attractiveness 
of the size of one side of the market to the other side and are 
said to hold the key for eventual development of the market 
system [2, 4, 5]. Notice that the two-sided market in this case 
includes behavioral asymmetry (see Figure 1). In this case, the 
first side is not interested in the second side directly, as their 
relation is mediated by a third element (i.e., the product or the 
module) offered by the second side (i.e., the developers of the 
engineered products or modules) through the platform. This is 
an important departure from other cases [3, 11] where there is 
relative symmetry between the two sides of the market and how 
they interact. Typical examples include customizable electronic 
components or devices, app stores for electronic devices and 
videogame consoles (i.e. Sony PlayStation, Nintendo, 
GameBox, etc.). 
At any time t+1, the size of the consumer side of the 
market can be expressed as the sum of the number of returning 
consumers from the previous time (t) and the number of new 
consumers that arrive between the previous and current time.  
In the proposed simplified model, we assume distant 
history does not play a significant role in determining the 
market size evolution and only market size in the previous time 
step is required to model the evolution of the market.  
On the consumer side, the number of returning consumers 
is computed using the death rate parameter (ε1), defined as: 
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 ε1 =
#consumers left from the previous state
#consumers in previous state
  
 
The number of new consumers is modeled as: 
 
 
Gu (.) = ε2 gu (nm(t))
affinity value
!"# $#
  
 
where gu (.)  stands for the consumer side affinity curve and is 
a function of the number of modules nm (t)  available over the 
platform. Here the parameter ε2  is defined as the birth rate and 
is a function of the same-side effects on the consumer side and 
depends on the adoption of new products or modules by the 
consumers [10, 11], given the description of the other side of 
the market (i.e., visibility over the “curtain”). The birth rate 
parameter acts as a multiplicative factor on the affinity value. 
Note that both ε2  and gu (.)  have to be non-negative to have 
finite number of new arrivals at any time step.  
The factors influencing the birth rate parameter include 
advertisements, endorsements, the bandwagon effect, 
incentives and others [2, 3, 4, 5, 11].  
Please note that the rate parameters (ε1,ε2 )  need not be 
stationary and could be time-varying under a general setting. In 
such situations, we can use and expected value or a projected 
value of the rate parameters for use in the analysis. 
Similarly we can model the evolution of the product side of 
the market with the death and birth rate parameters (ε3,ε4 )  on 
the product side.  
Combining all the element of the model, we arrive at the 
final description of the simplified model for the two-sided 
market: 
 
nu (t +1) = (1− ε1)nu (t)+ ε2gu (nm(t))
nm(t +1) = (1− ε3)nm(t)+ ε4gm(nu (t))
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
      Eq. (1)  
 
Notice that there is an important asymmetry between the 
two sides in this case. On the product side, there are developers 
who will engineer the product or modules while the consumers 
are interested in the products alone and not directly affected by 
the developers. This introduces asymmetry in their behavior. 
The number of products and the number of developer teams’ is 
related by: 
 nm(t) = h(nd (t))        Eq. ( 2)  
 
where nd (.)  stands for the number of developers or 
development organizations that are developing modules for the 
platform. Going forward, we will adopt a primarily consumer 
side view and work with the number of modules nm (.)  in 
subsequent analysis. Please note that a developer side centric 
analysis could work with nd (.)  as a primary independent 
variable. 
The evolution of the market size is given as: 
 
 
Δnu (t) ≡ nu (t +1)− nu (t) = ε2gu (nm(t))− ε1nu (t)
Δnm(t) ≡ nm(t +1)− nm(t) = ε4gm(nu (t))− ε3nm(t)
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
    Eq. (3)  
 
The evolution of the combined market size is given as: 
 
 Δm(t) = [ε2gu (nm(t))+ ε4gm(nu (t))]− [ε1nu (t)+ ε3nm(t)]  
 
From Eq. (3) and the above relation, notice that the evolution of 
any side depends on the number of new arrivals and the number 
of departing consumers at any time step. For equilibrium of any 
side of the market, we require the number of departures to be 
exactly balanced by the number of new consumers. This 
ensures that there is no eventual growth in the market size as 
such and the market is in steady state.  
For the discussion herein, we have assumed that the 
affinity curves as well as the four rate parameters are available 
or estimable. In that sense, the mathematical model introduced 
here is a macroscopic model that embeds microscopic 
information about the market through the affinity curves and 
the rate parameters. Later in this paper, we will demonstrate an 
application of stochastic choice-based model using a bottom-up 
approach to estimation of affinity curves. 
 
 
3.  EQUILIBRIUM OF TWO-SIDED MARKETS 
In this section, we discuss about the equilibrium of 
different sides of the market and also about equilibrium of the 
overall market system.  
At equilibrium, the market system is in steady state with 
the number of arrivals to any side is being balanced by the 
number of departures of participants from that side. The overall 
market system is frozen in a state and requires external impetus 
to move out of this frozen state. Ability to find the system 
equilibrium states could provide guidelines for downstream 
platform engineering and module technology roadmap.  
For consumer side equilibrium, we should have: 
 
 nu (t +1) = nu (t) ≡ nu
*  
 
For module or product side equilibrium, we have: 
 
 nm(t +1) = nm(t) ≡ nm
*  
 
Combining them with the growth relations in Eq. (3), we arrive 
at the following system equilibrium condition:  
 
 
ε2gu (nm
* (t))− ε1nu
*(t) = 0
ε4gm(nu
*(t))− ε3nm
* (t) = 0
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
    Eq. (4)  
 
where (nu*,nm* )  are the fixed-points of the system of nonlinear 
equations described in Eq. (4). These fixed-points represent the 
equilibrium of the two-sided market system. The fixed-points 
can be computed analytically in some cases with canonical 
affinity curves (as shown in Figure 2), but will have to be 
solved numerically under more general conditions. In this 
paper, the above system of equations is solved using 
MATLABTM [15] that handles more realistic cases where the 
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 affinity curves are defined piece-wise and represented in an 
incremental fashion over time [14]. As an example, in Figure 2 
below, system equilibrium points are shown for resource-
constrained affinity curves where Eq. (4) can be represented as: 
nu* =
Ku
1+ e−αu (nm−βu )
 and nm* =
Km
1+ e−αm (nu−βm ) , where{K ,α ,β}  
are the model parameters. They represent the product/module 
side and the consumer side equilibrium conditions respectively.  
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Figure. 2: Equilibrium points for a market system with resource-constrained 
affinity curves. 
 
Note that there are three equilibrium points with one being 
the resource cap equilibrium where both sides of the market 
have been saturated and another being very close to the origin. 
For attaining critical mass, one needs to reach the second 
equilibrium point in this case. The number and characterization 
of the equilibrium points are strongly dependent on the affinity 
curves. 
These equilibrium points can be further classified into 
stable and unstable equilibrium. In the next section we will 
investigate the stability of the market system around its 
equilibrium points. 
 
 
4.  STABILITY CONDITIONS AND AFFINITY CURVES 
In case of a stable equilibrium state, small perturbations in 
the form of external stimuli are insufficient to move the market 
system away from the equilibrium state. This provides the 
steady-state condition for the market system. Attainment of a 
non-zero equilibrium point within a shorter timeframe is 
important for the two-sided market system since this indicates 
achievement of critical mass and a plausible path to future 
sustainability and growth.  
Let us look at the stability of the fixed points of the two-
sided market system using Eq. (4). The two-sided market 
system represents a discrete dynamical system [12, 13, 14] of 
the form: 
xt+1 = f (xt , yt )
yt+1 = g(xt , yt )
⎫
⎬
⎭
 
 
The system (as in Eq. (4)) at fixed points (nu*,nm* )  can be 
written as: 
nu* = f (nu*,nm* )
nm* = g(nu*,nm* )
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
 
 
The corresponding Jacobian [13,14] for the market system is: 
 
J ≡
∂ f
∂nu (nu* ,nm* )
∂ f
∂nm (nu* ,nm* )
∂g
∂nu (nu* ,nm* )
∂g
∂nm (nu* ,nm* )
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
 
 
Using Eq. (4) with the above definition, we have the following 
Jacobian matrix for the two-sided market system: 
 
J = (1− ε1) θ
ϕ (1− ε3)
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
⎥
 
 
where θ ≡ ε2
∂gu (.)
∂nm
;ϕ ≡ ε4
∂gm (.)
∂nu
.  
For local stability, the absolute eigenvalues λ1,2  of the 
Jacobian matrix at the fixed-point (i.e., equilibrium points) 
should be less than one. Hence for local stability at the 
equilibrium point, we should have:  
 
λ1,2 (J )(nu* ,nm* ) <1  
 
The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, J are given by the 
solution of the following quadratic equation: 
 
λ 2 − λ(tr(J ))+ det(J ) = 0     Eq. (5)   
 
where, det(J ) = (1− ε1)(1− ε3)−θϕ ; tr(J ) = 2 − (ε1 + ε3)  
and the eigenvalues are related by: 
 
λ1 + λ2 =
tr(J )
2
λ1λ2 = det(J )
⎫
⎬
⎪
⎭⎪
       Eq. (6)   
 
Since both roots of Eq.(5) should have their absolute value 
smaller than 1, the stability conditions can also be expressed as: 
 
 1
4 2[tr(J )]
2 − 4det(J )+ 2tr(J ) [tr(J )]2 − 4det(J )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ <1
 
 
1
4 2[tr(J )]
2 − 4det(J )− 2tr(J ) [tr(J )]2 − 4det(J )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ <1  
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 The above two inequalities can be combined to derive the 
stability: 
[tr(J )]2 < 2(1+ det(J ))   
 
This yields the following condition for stability of the 
equilibrium point: 
θϕ < (ε1 + ε3)−
1
2 (ε1
2 + ε3
2 )   
 
If the eigenvalues were complex, the corresponding stability 
condition reduces to: 
 
det(J ) <1
⇒θϕ > ε1ε3 − (ε1 + ε3)
  
 
Combining the above conditions, we can write the overarching 
stability condition at system equilibrium points as: 
 
ε1ε3 − (ε1 + ε3) <θϕ < (ε1 + ε3)−
1
2 (ε1
2 + ε3
2 )  
 
For very small values of the death rate parameters (ε1,ε3) , 
which is realistic in most real-world applications, we can 
approximate the stability condition further: 
 
−(ε1 + ε3) <θϕ < (ε1 + ε3)
⇒ θϕ < (ε1 + ε3)
  
 
Note that the stability condition can be expressed in terms 
of the death rate parameters on either side of the platform only. 
Also notice that we cannot have a stable equilibrium if the 
death rates are zero on both sides. 
In the following section, we will apply this methodology to 
canonical affinity curves and identify stability conditions in 
such cases. 
Example: Stability conditions for canonical affinity 
curves 
It is amply clear from the above discussion that we require 
at least some knowledge about the affinity curves gu (.)  and 
gm (.)  to find the market equilibrium points and assess their 
stability.  
Let us look at few simple canonical affinity curves and 
examine the stability of equilibrium points in each case. 
 
Case 1: Simple S-curves -  
Let us assume that both sides of the market can be 
characterized by simple S curves of the form: 
gu (.) ≡ gumax
nm
1+ nm
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
gm (.) ≡ gmmax
nu
1+ nu
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎤
⎦
⎥
  
Assuming small death rate parameter values, thereby 
neglecting the 2nd order effects, the stability condition at 
equilibrium points can be expressed as: 
 
(1+ nu* )(1+ nm* ) >
ε2ε4
ε1 + ε3
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
gumaxgmmax   
 
This stability condition can further be approximated as: 
 
nu*nm* >
ε2ε4
ε1 + ε3
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
gumaxgmmax  
 
Hence, for stable equilibrium, the product of market size of 
both sides should be higher than the square root of the product 
of limiting values of affinity on both sides. This is the “square 
root” law for stability.  
We can derive similar stability conditions for more 
complex functional forms of S-curve like affinity curves, but 
they become increasingly complicated. 
 
Case 2: Power law affinity curves - 
Let us assume affinity curves to be of power law form 
(which includes the linear affinity curves as a special case) 
where the powers represent the degree of super (sub)-linearity 
associated with the affinity curves: 
 
gu (.) ≡ anmα ;  α > 0, a > 0
gm (.) ≡ bnuβ ;  β > 0, b > 0
  
 
where, θϕ = (ε2ε4 )(ab)(αβ )(nm* )α−1(nu* )β−1 > 0 . If death rate 
parameters are small, we can neglect the 2nd order effects and 
arrive at the following stability condition:  
 
nm*( )α−1
nu*( )1−β
< (ε1 + ε3)
ε2ε4( )(ab)(αβ )
 
 
This condition is quite interesting for different regimes 
with different values of exponents α and β. Since the numerator 
on the right hand side of the above inequality is rather small, 
the market size on the product side has to be much smaller than 
the consumer side to have stable equilibrium. 
In case of linear affinity curves on both sides (i.e., α = β = 
1), the stability condition is independent of the market sizes: 
 
ab < (ε1 + ε3)
ε2ε4( )
  
 
This is understandable since there could be only one 
equilibrium point and this point is stable only if the product of 
the rates of affinity (i.e., coefficients a and b in the affinity 
curve equations) is limited.  
If the product side of the market shows linear affinity, we 
have β = 1 and for stability, we require: 
 
nm*( )α−1 < (ε1 + ε3)ε2ε4( )(ab)(α )
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 This implies that for α > 1, we are likely to attain stable 
equilibrium with much smaller number of products. This is a 
desirable scenario from the platform’s perspective. 
If the consumer side affinity is super-linear (i.e., α > 1) 
with sub-linear (i.e., β < 1) affinity on the product/module side, 
then it is possible to attain stable equilibrium with small 
number of products (only if there exists an equilibrium point 
with small number of products). This will likely be the most 
desirable situation for sustainability of two-sided market 
systems. Please note that this condition of super-linear affinity 
on consumer side is not trivial to achieve in a short time.  
The next section provides details on construction of 
affinity curves using a bottom-up, stochastic choice model. 
This approach can be extended and transitioned into an agent-
based approach in the future. From initial results we can see 
that such bottom-up affinity curves can be well approximated 
using canonical affinity curves. 
 
 
5.  A BOTTOM-UP APPROACH FOR GENERATION OF 
AFFINITY CURVES 
Correlating the shape and the magnitude of the affinity 
curves with economic, social and strategic factors is 
challenging. The questions about modeling the affinity curves 
and the factors impacting them are still open. In order to answer 
these questions, we employ simple stochastic choice models to 
mathematically represent individuals.  
In this section, we introduce two simple stochastic choice 
models and demonstrate how we could leverage such choice 
models in a bottom-up approach to generate affinity curves.  
The stochastic choice model consists of three separate 
entities related one to the others. In this context, we will call 
mathematical representation of a user an “agent”. Agents that 
are interested in exploiting the value of the platform are called 
“Users”. Agents that develop products/modules over the 
platform are called “Developers”. Modules do not have any 
active behavior, but they increase the attractiveness of the 
platform for Users and determine the investment opportunity 
for Developers. 
The general structure and behavior of agents was derived 
by direct observation and expert opinion. Consumer behavior is 
consistent with the Theory of Planned Behavior [16] and the 
bounded rationality assumption [17], while Developers behave 
as perfectly rational economic agents, evaluating the 
perspective profits given a limited amount of information [18].  
Products/modules are the key element in the model. They 
are passive and their attributes affect both sides. These 
attributes are: 
 
• Type: the class of module a single module represents 
• Innovation level: the novelty of the modules in terms 
of technology, functionality and performance 
• Cost of investment K0: the total cost of investment 
required to offer the modules on the market 
• Mark Up MU: the fraction of the Price of a single 
module that goes into profits 
• Time in the market T: the length of the time during 
which the module is available in the market 
• Costs cm: cost to sell a single module 
 
Modules are both the reason why a consumer is attracted 
by the platform and a source of costs and revenues for the 
developers. Users and Providers are the active parts of the 
model; they join an industry platform for different reasons, as 
the two-sided market is asymmetric. 
The consumers are attracted by modules that are available 
over the platform. It is assumed that they join the platform once 
a certain number of modules are offered. In fact, the more 
modules/products are present on the platform, the more likely 
that the consumers are able to satisfy their needs.  
Consumers are characterized by two classes of parameters: 
 
• Module preference  Pm : vector quantifying how much 
a consumer is attracted by a certain class of module  
• Threshold Tg: value between 0 and 1 quantifying the 
propensity to join the platform; 
 
Given a certain number of modules present in the platform, 
each consumer is subject to the following computation: 
 
 Im = Pm ⋅G
*        (7) 
 
Where *G is a vector of i components calculated according 
to: 
                                 Gi
* = min(Gi ,Gmax )      (8) 
 
Here G is a vector that contains the number of modules in 
the ith class and Gmax is the maximum number of modules per 
class that a consumer is able to consider at the same time. The 
value of Gmax plays an important role in the shape of the affinity 
functions. This limit was introduced to model the limits in 
cognitive bandwidth when a choice is made, in accordance with 
the bounded rationality assumption. If the interest Im is greater 
than the threshold Tg, the agent joins the platform; otherwise, it 
does not. 
Preferences and threshold can be derived from several 
sources, like surveys, conjoint analysis and focus groups. Later 
in this paper, we derive the interests from a set of online 
reviews of smartphones. 
Developers are modeled using four types of parameters: 
 
• Module types offered: the type of modules that the 
developer is able to provide to the platform 
• Module variety offered: the number of modules types 
that any developer is able to provide to the platform 
• Variation in expected market share wh: the minimum 
and maximum market penetration agents can expect 
• Expected uncertainty in market Trend wu: the 
minimum and maximum change in forecasted market 
trend over the investment horizon. 
 
Each developer agent chooses to join the platform given a 
financial feasibility based on the return of investment or ROI. A 
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 developer joins the platform if and only if the ROI is positive, 
otherwise, does not. The ROI is estimated as follows: 
 
0 0
0
VA KROI
K
−=
 
 
 
VA0 = p
whnu
1+ r
+ whwuΔnu
1
(1+ r)tt=2
T
∑⎛⎝⎜
⎞
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p = MU
1− MU
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
cm  
                            
Here K0 is the cost of investment, VA0 is the discounted 
benefit of the investment, dependent on the price of the module 
p. Here, wh is the expected market share, nu is the number of 
consumers that have already adopted the platform, and r is the 
discount rate. The uncertainty in market trend is given by wu, 
while T represents the investment horizon. The anticipated 
average increase in number of consumers during the investment 
horizon is Δnu, MU is the module’s mark-up and cm is the cost 
for selling the module. 
It is important to remark that the agents’ forecast is 
approximated with a linear average increase over time; in 
reality, developers can potentially carry out analyses with a 
higher degree of fidelity, which are not considered in this paper 
for the sake of computational simplicity.  
Example: Generation of Affinity Curves using 
stochastic choice models 
The choice model is sensitive to the behavioral and 
economic parameters that are given as an input. The platform 
considered as a case study is a modular electronic device, like 
the ones proposed in [19]. The platform provider is in charge of 
the central bus structure, while independent developers are in 
charge of designing sensors, batteries and processing units. The 
two-sided market is therefore composed of phone purchasers 
(the consumers or users) and module developers. We did not 
consider secondary market for modules where existing 
consumers can exchange modules with other consumers.  
It is hypothesized that the modules fall into twelve 
categories, of which six are optional sensors and the others are 
essential modules like power and storage units (see below 
Table 1). It is also supposed that the modules can be classified 
according to three innovation levels, which influence both the 
consumer interests and the cost of investment required.  
According to experts, the cost of investment ranges from 
100,000 $ for adapted or optimized modules (i.e., modules that 
are available in some form or the technology is fairly matured), 
to 3 million $ for very innovative processor unit or medical 
sensors. Each baseline investment cost was then varied 
randomly by 15% around the average value to simulate 
contingencies in project costs. 
Typical values for module mark-up were obtained from 
online resources [20, 21]. The same sources provided some data 
regarding the costs of components in traditional smartphones. 
Since the market considered is very young, a value of 20% was 
chosen for the mark-up. Finally, it is forecasted that a module 
will remain available on the market for 12 months.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Modules classes with their variants 
 
Five different user agents were modeled with the help of 
technical parameters and review data from 
www.verizonwireless.com and www.gsmarena.com. The five 
user agent types were individuals who indicated that their 
primary mobile phone use was for texting, talking, 
communicating on social media, surfing the web and 
interacting with applications.  It was assumed that module 
satisfaction was proportional to module preference and 
normalized module performance. Data was collected regarding 
5 areas of satisfaction and a large number of technical 
performance variables from 15 popular mobile phones. Our 
analysis used twelve module classes (j) and a subset of 24 
performance variables (k) that were mapped to the five areas of 
user satisfaction (i).  Performance variables k were also mapped 
to module classes j. Preferences πk for individual performance 
variables k were then calculated for each agent type. 
Preferences for individual modules Pj were then determined via 
uniformly weighted average of preferences for performance 
variables k. 
 
/ max( )
i
k
k k
Satisfaction
performance performance
π =              
 
( )
j k k
k Module j
P w π
∈
= ∑                                                  
 
The various Pj then form the vector P  present in Eq. (7). Note 
that module preferences are normalized by the maximum 
preference for optimized modules across all 5 agents. 
As mentioned before, each of the 12 module types was 
assumed to have three innovation levels. Notional preference 
multipliers of 1, 1.5 and 2 were used to denote the increases in 
preferences for modules with increasing novelty features.  
Information about Developers is fuzzier, as the community 
is still very young and there are no historical data on these 
platforms. We made the simplifying assumption that each 
developer can introduce one module at a time. Market 
penetration between 20% and 80% was randomly set for each 
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 developer. The expected uncertainty in future market projection 
was derived from app market data [20], which shows that 
predictions about future market can vary in between -25% and 
+25% (if the initial phase is not considered). For this reason, 
each developer was assigned a random value of wu between 
0.75 and 1.25. 
The consumer side was simulated with number of modules 
available ranging from 10 to 5000. The variety of Modules was 
randomly selected for each trial, and 200 trial results were 
averaged to reduce the noise in the data. In a similar fashion, 
the developer’s side was simulated 200 times; each time, a 
different developer population was generated. It was assumed 
that each developer could introduce only one module into the 
market at any given time step. Developers’ affinity function 
depends not only on the number of consumers, but also on the 
projected future consumer bases. As mentioned before, this 
quantity cannot be known a priori, but it must be estimated. 
Each simulation consists of a full-factorial combination of 
number of consumers and mean, forecasted growth of the 
consumer base, the first one increasing linearly from 0 to 
30,000, and the second one from 0 to 50,000. For the consumer 
side, the baseline value of 106 consumers was chosen.  
We propose two different regression models for the 
consumer affinity curve and one for the developer affinity 
curve. The differences in the consumer model are due to the 
different saturation effects in their choice model. In the first 
scenario, it is supposed that the preference P is not bounded by 
a maximum number of modules Gmax and therefore the 
likelihood of purchasing a device increases continuously with 
the number of modules being offered on the market. This 
scenario leads to the following family of consumer affinity 
curve: 
 gu1(nm ) = A0 + A1nm + A2nm
2 + A3nm
3  
 
Where gu1 is the affinity curve, nm is the number of modules and 
the constants Ai are derived from regression analysis. The 
values of the constants, as well as other statistical indices are 
shown in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Coefficient from Users’ curve linear regression analysis in absence of 
saturation 
Coefficient Value p-value of t-test 
A0 7.47 102 0.67 
A1 2.30 0.45 
A2 9.68 10-4 0.49 
A3 4.97 10-7 0.79 10-2 
RMSE 4.55 103 ---  
R2 0.909 ---  
p-value F-statistic < 10-3 ---  
 
 
From the R2 value, as well as from Figure 3, we observe 
that the regression model capture trends in the data quite well.  
!nm#  
Figure 3: Users’ affinity curve when saturation effects are absent 
 
In the second scenario, a limit of 50 Modules is imposed 
on the consumer choice model, so that if more than 50 modules 
of a type are offered on the market, the surplus does not affect 
the overall preferences. This second constraint, expressed in 
Eq. 8, is introduced in order to account for the limits in 
cognitive bandwidth when a choice is made. 
In this case, consumer interest is limited by a threshold on 
the maximum number of modules per class that the agent can 
consider simultaneously in its choice. In this case, the data 
present a typical S-curve shape (see Figure 4 below): 
 
 
gu2(nm ) =
B0
1+ exp(−B1(nm − B2 ))
 
	  
Table 3: Coefficient from Users’ curve linear regression analysis in presence of 
saturation 
Coefficient Value 
B0 80188 
B1 0.0114 
B2 425 
RMSE 1.23 105 
R2 0.72 
 
!nm#  
Figure 4: Users’ affinity curve when saturation effects are present 
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 The two consumer affinity models are compatible, since it 
can be said that in the presence of saturation effects, the first 
curve does not increase forever, but saturates around an 
asymptote. 
Focusing on the other side of the market, the developer 
affinity curve shape was derived from regression analysis on a 
subset of the total computational results. The affinity curve is 
non-linear (see Figure 5). Two areas can be identified: one in 
which the affinity curve remains equal to zero for various 
combinations of nu and Δnu, and another one in which the 
affinity curve grows. This logically leads to a function defined 
in branches: 
 
 gm(nu ,Δnu ) = f (nu ,Δnu )   if L ≥ 0 
 gm(nu ,Δnu ) = 0     Otherwise 
 
where gm is the developer affinity curve and L is a relationship 
linking nu and Δnu. Analysis of the transition zone results in the 
following definition of L: 
 
 L = Δnu − l1nu − l2  
 
Where l1 and l2 are constant coefficients derived from 
regression analysis. The Table 4 below provides the 
coefficients and other relevant statistical indices: 
	  
Table 4: Coefficient from linear regression analysis for transient zone 
Coefficient Value p-value of t-test 
l1 3.82 103 < 10-3 
l2 -0.074 < 10-3 
RMSE 74.5 ---  
R2 0.995 ---  
p-value F-statistic < 10-3 ---  
 
 
gm#>#0#
gm#=#0#
 
Figure 5. Representation of the transient zone for Developers’ affinity curve 
 
The resulting best-fit developer affinity curve (see Figure 6) is 
a fourth-order polynomial whose coefficients are reported 
below:  
 
Table 5: Coefficient from developers curve analysis in absence of consumer 
side saturation 
Term in the 
polynomial 
Estimated Value of 
the coefficient 
p-value of t-test 
Δnu 6.31 10-1 < 10-3 
nuΔnu -3.33 10-6 < 10-3 
Δnu2 -3.47 10-5 < 10-3 
nu2Δnu 4.60 10-11 < 10-3 
nuΔnu2 1.11 10-9 < 10-3 
Δnu3 6.00 10-9 < 10-3 
nu2Δnu2 -6.35 10-12 < 10-3 
nu3Δnu -9.94 10-17 < 10-3 
nuΔnu3 -8.03 10-14 < 10-3 
Δnu4 -3.06 10-13 < 10-3 
RMSE 0.94 ---  
R2 0.999 ---  
p-value F-statistic < 10-3 ---  
 
 
!
gm#
 
 
Figure 6: Developers affinity curve  
 
The proposed curves represent an initial attempt at 
characterizing affinity curves from numerical simulations. The 
choice model needs to be refined with more features, and the 
robustness of the results must be tested against real data. 
Nevertheless, these affinity curve shapes allow us to 
characterize the stability of the equilibrium points resulting 
from the intersection of these curves.  
Notice that the approximated affinity curves can be 
represented by well known canonical affinity curves like 
additive power law curves and S curves.  
 
 
6.  IMPACT OF TWO-SIDED MARKET MODEL ON 
ENGINEERING CHARACTERISTICS  
In contrast to products in isolation, the set of architectures 
supported via a single two-sided platform grows over time.  
This growth occurs through the evolution of a two-sided market 
that connects users and module developers through the 
platform. The coupling between the possible technical 
evolutions of the platform and the evolution of the two-sided 
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 market necessitates taking into account economic and platform 
engineering early on via two-sided market simulation.  
An evolving architecture over time can be examined by 
conducting enumeration of different combinations of modules 
subject to engineering feasibility constraints. Feasibility 
constraints can be anything from simple experience-based rules 
pertaining to the existence of individual 
components/connections (i.e., “node constraints”) to more 
sophisticated constraints that leverage engineering principles 
and heuristics and apply to groups of connections/components    
We generated 3072 feasible module bundles from the 
library of 12 module classes at 3 different innovation levels 
(see Table 1). First cost was determined through the summation 
of the assumed prices of individual modules. Potential 
satisfaction was determined based on normalized preferences 
for modules and their performance metrics.  
The enumeration was carried out as follows: 
 
1. Design Space Definition: All possible connections and 
components were expressed via a design structure 
matrix based adjacency matrix that contained all 
possible pairwise feasible connections using an 
enhanced Design Structure Matrix, called DS2M. For 
this analysis the DS2M were generated based 
primarily on simple connection type compatibility 
(e.g. outputs can only flow to inputs and vice versa for 
each connection type). 
 
2. Component Enumeration: All possible components in 
the DS2M matrix were expressed via a binary decision 
vector.  A depth first search was conducted subject to 
rule-bases to determine feasible module bundles. 
 
3. Connection Enumeration: The output of component 
enumeration was fed into connection enumeration.  
Every feasible bundle of components had a set of 
pairwise feasible connections in the DS2M defined 
previously. This set of potentially feasible connections 
was converted into a binary decision vector.  A depth 
first search was conducted subject to connection rules 
until a way to feasibly connecting the modules in 
bundle was found. 
 
The design of a two-sided platform and the initial set of 
modules available on the platform strongly influence the 
evolution of the two-sided market. Note that each point in 
Figure 7 represents a module bundle as evaluated by one of the 
5 user types mentioned earlier.  
In Figure 7, the set of initial modules and the platform 
define the possible architectures as well as initial architectural 
evolution pathways available to users.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Pareto-front architectures for the modular electronic device 
 
To successfully design the platform and choose an initial 
set of modules we therefore need to simulate the behavior of 
the two-sided market enabled by platform between consumers 
and module developers. For example, the overarching two-
sided market analysis could provide a module development 
roadmap that needs to be exercised for sustainable evolution of 
the platform.  
 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper proposes s simplified mathematical model of 
the two-sided markets based on dynamical system theory and 
captures the cross-side effects using affinity curves and same 
side effects using the birth and death rate parameters for both 
sides of the market. In order to have new adopters on either 
side, we require positive affinity from cross-side interactions 
and positive birth rate parameter from the same side effects.  
We leveraged the dynamical model to compute the fixed-
points or the equilibrium points of the two-sided market system 
and derived conditions for achieving stable equilibrium. Stable 
equilibrium indicates a steady state of operation of the system 
where there is no net growth on either side of the market and 
requires external impetus to get unstuck from this state.  
We derived the two-sided markets’ affinity curves from a 
bottom-up perspective using a statistical choice model, 
consisting of two types of agents. A modular electronic device 
was introduced as a case study. The agent’s behavioral 
parameters were mainly derived from an online database for the 
consumers’ side and from expert opinion for the 
product/module developers’ side. Analytical affinity curves 
were derived using nonlinear regression analyses on the choice 
model’s simulation results. The affinity curves were found to 
be representative of well-known canonical forms for which 
analytical results on equilibrium and stability of the market 
system can be arrived at. 
We derived the “square root law” for stability if the affinity 
curves can be approximated using simple S-curve profile. It 
was shown that the stability condition is independent of market 
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 size if we have linear affinity curves for both sides. The most 
desirable situation from platform’s perspective is when the 
consumer affinity grows super-linearly since one can achieve 
stability with relatively small number of products or module 
offerings over the platform. But attaining this “favorable 
condition” may be difficult in practice for two-sided markets. 
When there is no or little “real market”, providing external 
incentive to improve the affinity usually has positive impact. 
When there exists a real module or products, it might be 
useful to focus external incentives to the consumer side to 
attain ε2 >1  in the market initialization phase (i.e., before 
reaching the critical mass).  
Many research directions can be envisioned in order to 
refine the choice model. Consumers’ choice does not consider 
the effect of price in the simplified example discussed herein. 
Several model from marketing literature, like the logit model, 
can improve the agents’ behavior on this aspect. Secondly, 
many parameters in the models are based on experience and 
opinions, and they need to be checked against other platforms. 
Furthermore, more case studies need to be considered to prove 
the generality of the affinity curves’ equations. 
In future, we can extend the model to multi-sided platforms 
and develop the equilibrium and stability conditions for such 
market systems. Further refinement of affinity curves to include 
distribution of module or product types that are available is 
another area of improvement. Integration of the two-sided 
market model with characteristics of the underlying engineering 
platform creates a framework to study what if scenarios as well 
as sequential evolution path for optimal evolution of the 
platform. 
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